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Abstract 
This paper employs the European Social Survey and the World Values Survey to 
empirically investigate civic participation of immigrants from fifty-four countries of origin to the 
European Union. Three sets of issues are addressed in this paper. First, the paper aims at 
understanding what factors determine civic participation of immigrants at large. Second, it seeks 
to shed light on differences and similarities between participation outcomes of immigrants and 
natives. The main part of the paper is dedicated to testing culture transmission and culture 
assimilation hypothesis with respect to civic participation. Culture assimilation is analysed 
within the traditional synthetic cohort methodology, and also by testing whether the levels of 
immigrants’ civic participation depend on the levels of natives’ civic participation in the same 
countries. Culture transmission is looked at by relating the levels of participation of non-
migrants in countries of origin to participation outcomes of those who migrate. In addition, the 
effect of other country of origin and country of destination characteristics on immigrants’ civic 
participation is investigated. The issue of immigrants’ self-selection is addressed by matching 
immigrants to otherwise similar natives and compatriots who did not migrate. The study finds 
limited evidence for the transmission of participation culture across borders, although certain 
home country characteristics continue influencing participation behaviour of individuals after 
migration: it is those from industrialized, net immigration, culturally more homogeneous 
countries who tend to participate more. On the other hand, the culture of current place of 
residence matters most in that by observing higher (lower) participation patterns among natives 
immigrants tend to participate more (less). 
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I. Introduction 
The immigrant population in Europe has been steadily increasing in the past decades and 
most probably will continue increasing in the future. Consequently, already today, first and 
second generation immigrants constitute large and growing percentages of young generations in 
Europe, with the total number of third-country nationals living in the 25 EU Member States in 
2005 estimated to be 11,44% of the total population (UN Statistics, 2005). The arrival and the 
continuing stay of immigrants, their families, the growth and diversification of both first and 
second generation of immigrants, raises questions about their involvement in processes affecting 
their lives and the lives of native residents, that is, about immigrants’ engagement into civic 
activities. 
While certain aspects of immigrants’ life are well documented in the literature, such as 
immigrants’ labour market assimilation (Borjas, 1995; Chiswick, 1978; Uhlendorff and 
Zimmermann, 2006), participation to welfare programs (Borjas, 2002; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; 
Riphahn, 1999), and fertility adjustment (Blau, 1991; Fernandez and Fogli, 2005), this paper 
sheds light on yet another aspect of immigrants’ behaviour in a receiving society: civic 
participation. Focusing on first generation immigrants only, it offers an empirical investigation 
of determinants of civic participation of immigrants; differences in propensity to participate 
between immigrants and natives; and whether culture transmission and/or culture assimilation of 
immigrants with respect to participation take place.  
With the notable exception of works by Dustmann (1996), who analyses the perceived 
feeling of national identity of immigrants, and by De Palo, Faini, and Venturini (2007), who 
study social interactions of immigrants, little is known about immigrants’ social assimilation. 
The latter, however, may have important implications for both the cultural assimilation at large, 
and also for immigrants’ economic integration, as well as the permanency of settlement 
intentions, all of which are currently hotly debated topics. This paper addresses a particular type 
of assimilation, assimilation with respect to civic participation, in a two-fold way. I use a 
traditional immigrant assimilation hypothesis, which predicts that the growth of civic 
involvement between two points in time should be greater for immigrants who have spent less 
time in the country at the beginning of period in consideration (Borjas, 1995). The synthetic 
cohort methodology is applied, allowing to disentangle the effects of years since migration, age 
at migration, ageing, and cohort effects. The positive effect of the years since migration on 
participation outcomes serves as potential evidence in support of assimilation hypothesis. In 
addition, I test whether the participation culture of the receiving society matters for determining 
immigrants’ participation outcomes, conjecturing that positive impact of overall natives’ rate of 
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participation can serve as another piece of evidence in favour of assimilation hypothesis. While 
recent literature has shown the way immigrants are perceived by host societies (for example, 
Dusmann and Preston, 2000; Mayda, 2005 study attitudes towards immigrants), little is still 
known about the way immigrants perceive host societies, and whether certain behavioural 
patterns of a receiving society have an impact on the behaviour of immigrants. 
Further, of interest is also to learn which effect has the strongest impact: the observed 
outcomes of natives, that is, the society in which an immigrant currently lives, or the observed 
outcomes of home country fellows back at home, that is, the society from which an immigrant 
originates? If an immigrant comes from a country where civic participation levels are high, 
would these participation levels and practices translate into her higher participation abroad? In 
other words, is there culture transmission in terms of participation? This is an important question 
in view of the research on economics and culture (such as Fernandez, 2007), ethnic capital and 
intergenerational transmission of culture (such as Borjas, 1992; Bisin and Verdier, 2001), since, 
once transmitted across boarders, the culture of civic participation may persist across 
generations.  
Methodologically, the research is close to the literature on immigrants’ participation to 
welfare programs, as well as to the literature on the fertility adjustment of migrant women. At 
the same time, a methodological novelty of this paper is to address the issue of immigrants’ self-
selection and to reduce potential bias that may stem from it by employing a matching technique, 
whereby matching immigrants to otherwise similar natives and compatriots who did not migrate. 
An advantage of such matching is that no assumption is put on whether immigrants are self-
selected from a lower or from an upper part of the participation outcomes’ distribution; rather, 
each immigrant is compared to a non-immigrant who, given other than the fact of migration 
characteristics, has the same probability to participate civically.   
This paper also goes deeper into the analysis of other home and host country effects, in 
addition to examining the impact of the average rates of civic participation in these societies. To 
complement the existing research of studying the overall effect of the country of origin (for 
instance, Bueker, 2005) I disentangle various home and host country effects that may determine 
participation outcomes, such as the degree of civic freedoms and democratic development, GDP 
per capita, industrialization, literacy, level of migration and religious fragmentation of both 
reference societies. 
In order to address these questions, I work with the European Social Survey (ESS), which 
provides extensive information on roughly 75,000 individuals (over the years 2002 to 2005) 
residing in 25 European Union countries. Of them, roughly six and a half thousands are foreign-
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born. The database contains information on socio-economic characteristics of individuals, as 
well as on various forms of their civic involvement. I use these data to construct a sample of 
roughly four thousand immigrants from fifty-four countries of origin in twenty European 
countries. The major drawback of this study is that the European Social Survey does not 
specifically target immigrant groups and is conducted with the registered population. Thus, there 
is an issue of representability of immigrants, as they appear in the sample only if they were 
registered at the time of the survey. There could also be a selection bias in favour of well-
educated and well-integrated immigrants, as there were no interview translations. As these 
factors are also correlated with civic participation (see below), the results may rather 
overestimate immigrant participation. The results of the study should be interpreted bearing in 
mind this limitation. On the other hand, ESS is one of the very few datasets which covers this 
many countries of origin and of destination, and which also contains a variety of questions on 
civic participation phrased in the same way across countries.  
In addition, to study the impact of the source country characteristics on current levels of 
immigrants’ activism, I employ the World Values Survey, constructing from it average 
participation rates in fifty-four countries of origin of immigrants to the EU. Further, I 
complement these data with the statistics of the UN Population Division, World Bank 
Development Indicators, and CIRI database, to construct other country characteristics. 
While the focus of this paper is on civic participation, there is no unique definition of 
civic activism (for a review of definitions and types of activities considered as civic activism, see 
Vogel and Triandafyllidou, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, I focus on active civic 
participation which implies political and social participation that goes beyond voting and gives 
voice to societal concerns, but that does not include civil activities (such as participation in 
sports clubs or hobby groups). In order to account for various possible types of participation, I 
focus on traditional forms of civic participation but also include those that are available to 
immigrants regardless of their citizenship and legal status, as the latter may restrict involvement 
into certain activities. Throughout the paper, by active civic participation, I mean membership in 
trade unions and political parties, unpaid work for a party or any other organization or 
association, signing petitions, boycotting certain products, and participation to lawful 
demonstrations. The choice of types of civic activities considered in this paper is also framed by 
the data availability. Inclusion of certain activities, such as signing petitions and boycotting 
products, is motivated by the fact that in the absence or limitation of voting rights immigrants 
may voice their concerns through mentioned actions. Voting is excluded from the analysis, as it 
is still very much restricted for non-citizens, and voting procedures differ greatly between the EU 
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countries. Furthermore, since voting may be mandatory in either a destination or an origin 
country, including it into the analysis would obscure the analysis of transmission of voluntary 
behaviours. Participation in trade unions is included, as recently trade unions became centers of 
help to immigrants, and participation to them is not limited neither by citizenship nor by the 
legality of the immigration status (Danese, 2001). Moreover, participation to trade unions gives 
immigrants “intermediate political rights” (Kosic and Tryandafyllidou, 2006), and is sometimes 
refereed to as to the “cradle of immigrants’ political participation” (Martiniello, 2005). 
The study finds limited evidence for the culture transmission hypothesis, although certain 
country characteristics do influence participation outcomes of immigrants: it is those from 
industrialized, net immigration, culturally more homogeneous countries who tend to participate 
more. On the other hand, there is a strong support for the culture assimilation with respect to 
participation hypothesis: while destination country characteristics have no significant impact on 
participation, it is by observing what natives do that immigrants tend to do the same.       
The paper is organized as follows. Section II lays down the background and develops the 
connection of this paper with the existing literature. Section III describes the data used for the 
analysis. In Section IV I elaborate on the estimation procedure and present the main results of 
this study. Section V provides robustness check for these results, employing alternative 
estimation techniques and propensity score matching to deal with selection bias. Finally, in 
Section VI the role of various country effects is examined, and Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Background and Related Literature 
The analysis of this paper, both in terms of developing the idea and in terms of 
methodology, is related to the following strands of literature: on immigrants’ involvement into 
civic activities and their political incorporation, on participation and social assimilation, on 
culture transmission, on immigrants’ participation to welfare programs, and also on the fertility 
choices of immigrants. Much of the research on immigrants’ participation has been done in the 
field of sociology and political economy. However, to the best of my knowledge, no research has 
been done on civic participation of immigrants using the economic tools of analysis, and this 
paper is trying to fill the gap. 
In terms of developing the ideas, this paper is motivated by a growing interest of policy-
makers in immigrants’ involvement into civic activities. Several academic and public policy-
oriented projects both in the USA and in Europe stimulated the research debate in the area. For 
example, Civic Participation Initiative sponsored by the Washington Area Partnership for 
Immigrants conducted an extensive study on immigrants’ civic participation in Washington in 
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2002 (ASDC report, 2002). In Europe, the most recent initiative has been a multi-faceted 
research conducted under the umbrella of the EC project “POLITIS: Building Europe with New 
Citizens? An Inquiry into Civic Participation of Naturalized Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 
Countries” (see Cyrus et al, 2006). POLITIS working paper series (for instance, Vogel and 
Triandafyllidou, 2005) address numerous challenges of understanding civic participation of 
immigrants, its determinants, barriers to participation, activation mechanism of immigrant's 
participation, as well as differences between natives and immigrants regarding participation. 
Further, Danese (2001) explores weaknesses and strengths of immigrant’s associations; 
Fennema and Tillie (1999) analyse differences in political participation and political trust 
between various ethnic groups in Amsterdam. Bueker (2005) investigates home country effects 
on acquisition of citizenship and on voting of ten immigration groups in the United States. 
Applying multivariate analysis, she finds strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
country of origin effects matter for the propensity of political incorporation, all other individual 
socio-economic factors taken into account. Bueker tests five hypotheses concerning voting and 
naturalization patterns: reversibility (which implies that difficulties associated with return 
migration would encourage higher rates of naturalization among certain immigrant groups), 
translation (political practises at the origin impact political behaviour at destination), 
mobilization (certain groups will exercise their political rights more fully in wake of highly 
developed ethnic communities), assimilation and gender diversity hypotheses. The difference of 
my study is that, apart from analysing civic participation beyond voting and aside naturalization, 
I delve deeper into the translation hypothesis, analysing how specific country characteristics, 
such as the average participation rates, home country institutions, to name a few (rather than the 
overall country effects captured by country dummies) transmit their effect across borders.  
There is a large literature that provides analysis of individual participation in various 
social activities and groups mainly relating it to the notion of social capital. The pioneering 
works of Putnam (1993, 1995), which document the declining participation of Americans in 
civic life, have become standard references for social scientists, including the economists. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) analyse various forms of participation of Americans. They 
construct a model that shows how a larger degree of heterogeneity in communities leads to lower 
social interaction. Using survey data on group membership in the US, they find strong empirical 
evidence that higher income inequality, racial, and, to a lesser extent, ethnic, fragmentation in the 
US localities lead to lower engagement into group activities. Helliwell (1996) addresses the 
question of differences in social capital between American and Canadian provinces, 
investigating the extent to which immigration is responsive to higher degrees of trust and income 
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equality. My paper builds up on this literature, contributing the distinction between natives and 
immigrants with respect to participation, while focusing only on civic engagement. 
This paper is also closely related to the literature on social assimilation of immigrants. In 
particular, one of the first attempts to study social assimilation is the work by Dustmann (1996), 
who analyses immigrants’ perception of national identity. While touching upon similar issues, I 
work with the real actions of individuals, such as membership or participation to demonstrations, 
rather than subjective measures of assimilation. Another closely related work is by De Palo, 
Faini, and Venturini (2007), who analyze the extent of social interactions of immigrants, such as 
the frequency of communication with neighbours and friends. 
My analysis of immigrants’ participation also touches the literature on culture 
transmission in general, both across generations and across nations. Transmission across 
generations is studied by Borjas (1992(a)) who finds that the skills of individuals depend on the 
skills of the parents and also on the average level of skills of the parents’ generation ethnic 
group, that is, that “ethnic transmission” takes place. Bisin and Verdier (2001) develop a 
theoretical model of intergenerational culture transmission, in which the acquisition of culture-
specific preferences by children depends on culture and social environment in which they live, as 
well as on the decisions of parents to bring up (culture-) specific qualities in their children. 
Fernandez and Fogli (2002) consider preference transmission across generations in showing that 
men whose mothers worked and were educated tend to marry educated women and women who 
also work. Their 2005 paper addresses culture transmission both across generations and nations, 
showing how work and fertility behaviour of second generation immigrant women in the US is 
affected by the work and fertility behaviour of women in the generation of their mothers in their 
countries of origin. Borjas (1992(b)) shows theoretically and empirically that the national origin 
of immigrants matters for the welfare recipiency, by analysing how economic characteristics of 
home country economies affect welfare recipiency of immigrants in the US. Current paper 
develops an important parallel with this literature by suggesting the ways in which home country 
participation rates as well as other home country characteristics influence immigrants’ 
participation.      
In terms of methodology, my treatment of civic participation follows closely the research 
on immigrants’ participation to welfare programs and also on the fertility choices of immigrants. 
For example, immigrants’ participation to means-tested entitlement programs in the US is 
investigated by Borjas and Hilton (1996). They find that immigrants are more likely to receive 
welfare benefits than natives and that immigrants receive benefits for longer periods of time. 
Differences in socio-economic characteristics between the two groups account only for a part of 
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the difference in receiving welfare benefits. Their analysis reveals that cohort, assimilation, and 
ageing effects matter for participation in the entitlement program. Moreover, participation of 
newly arriving immigrants is determined by the participation of immigrants of the previous 
waves, or networks. The research by Riphahn (1999) confirms that age, assimilation, and cohort 
effects in a large part determine welfare benefits receipt by German guest workers. She also 
shows the importance of the country of origin for the social assistance receipt.  
Along similar lines, Blau (1991) considers fertility choices of immigrant women and 
fertility assimilation. She analyses immigrant women from high-fertility countries and finds 
selectivity of women with respect to fertility. Using the framework of Borjas (1987), she shows 
how, again, cohort effects and the length of residence, as well as the home country 
characteristics such as the home country average fertility levels, play an important role for 
fertility choices. Blau also distinguishes between assimilation and disruption hypothesis and 
finds that both are at work. Fertility of immigrant women is initially disrupted by migration but 
then it takes up, however, it does not reach the levels of fertility of the source countries. In 
comparison, Mayer and Riphahn (1999) use count data models to confirm that among 
immigrants to Germany, it is the assimilation fertility model that is at work. Fernandez and Fogli 
(2005) continue the analysis of culture transmission for fertility and working hours choices, and 
find that home country fertility rates and labour market outcomes for women continue 
determining corresponding outcomes for second- generation immigrant women.   
This paper is most similar methodologically to Borjas and Hilton (1996), Blau (1991), 
and Fernandez and Fogli (2005), as it follows the logic of modelling participation to the welfare 
state and the fertility choices of immigrants. Likewise, it distinguishes between various effects 
that are at work, including assimilation, cohort, and ageing effects of immigration, and shows 
how both home and host country effects determine participation outcomes of immigrants. In 
addition, it adds to the existing literature by examining yet another aspect of immigrants’ life in 
the host society and of immigrants’ behaviour – their civic involvement.  
 
III. The Data 
This study uses the data from the European Social Survey (ESS), rounds one and two, 
and the World Values Survey (WVS), round four, which are publicly available.  
To start with, I use the ESS data for the years 2002/2003 and 2004/2005. The ESS is a 
survey that collects individual-level data in most European Union countries every two years 1. It 
                                                 
1 For detailed information about the data see the ESS documentation available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org 
and also Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005). 
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contains the main questionnaire with the same questions asked in each round, as well as rotating 
modules. The survey covers a wide range of socio-economic questions, including questions on 
participation in various types of activities.  
In this paper, I work with the main questionnaire of the survey (even though a rotating 
module of the first round contains more questions on civic participation, I am unable to use it, as 
it is not repeated in the second round). The ESS1 covers 22 countries and 42,359 individuals, of 
which 4,085 are born outside of country of current residence. Similarly, the ESS2 covers 24 
countries and 45,681 individuals, of which 3,924 are foreign-born. The ESS provides 
information on the individual’s country of birth, as well as on the amount of time spent in the 
country for foreign-born, allowing to distinguish between natives and immigrants.  
The sample constructed from the ESS includes both first-generation immigrants and 
natives. First, both rounds of the ESS are merged and data on males and females who are 14-70 
years old are kept. Foreign-born whose country of origin is not specified, whose both parents are 
born in the destination country, and individuals from the countries of origin that are represented 
by less than 5 foreign-born in a destination country, are excluded from this sample. The resulting 
sample includes immigrants from fifty-four countries of origin. Second, the sample is 
“synchronized” to include only those countries for which the data are available in both rounds 
(time variability will be needed, as described further). Thus, Italy, Iceland, Israel, Ukraine, 
Estonia and Slovakia, for which the data are available only in one of the two rounds, are 
excluded from the sample. In fact, leaving these countries out helps refining the pool of 
immigrants: for example, over 90% of foreign-born in Estonia and Ukraine are Russians, and 
they arguably can be considered as international migrants (having mostly moved during the 
Soviet Union times, they accomplished migration of internal character). Thus, there are 20 
countries in the final sample: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia. This sample contains 3,889 
immigrants, of whom 1,856 were interviewed in ESS Round 1, and 2,033 in ESS Round 2; as 
well as 62,233 natives.  
From the ESS rounds, all further data on socio-economic characteristics of individuals, as 
well as the area characteristics, are constructed. Full summary statistics and description of 
variables are provided in the Appendix, Tables A1 and A2. 
The dependent variable called “civic participation” takes value one if an individual has 
reported to have participated in at least one of the following activities in the past 12 months: 
trade unions (active membership), party (active membership), work for a party, work for a 
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similar organization or association, signing petitions, boycotting products, or participating to 
lawful demonstrations. It takes a value zero otherwise. This variable is used for the main analysis 
throughout the paper. In addition, dummy variables for each type of participation were 
constructed, for example, membership in a trade union is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an 
individual has been an active trade union member for the past 12 months, and zero otherwise. 
These dependent variables are used only in the first section of the empirical analysis. It is 
important to stress that only active membership in trade unions and in parties is considered: the 
survey question allows for responses “being a member”, “being an active member”, and “not a 
member”. Using only active membership immediately allows focusing on individual actions and 
choices, while using “being a member” category may artificially increase the pool of “activists” 
by including those who are members as a result of an institutional setup in a specific country or a 
sector. 
Table 1 summarizes percentages of immigrants involved into various types of civic 
activities. As can be seen, 48.14% of 3,878 immigrants are engaged civically in some way. Most 
of those who participate civically do it in a form of signing petitions (48.31% of all civically 
active), becoming a member of a trade union (39.96%), boycotting certain products (37.96%), or 
working for some organization or association (23.49%). Additionally, Tables A3 and A4 of the 
Appendix shed light on the overlap of various forms of the participation. There are few 
individuals who report to be involved in a particular activity and only in it: for example, of those 
who work for a party, only 8.05% are not involved in any other activity under consideration, 
while this number is the highest for trade union membership: 51.34%. The biggest overlap is of 
working in parties and participating in public demonstrations with signing petitions: it is 60.69% 
and 60.89% correspondingly. Still, out of those who sign petitions there are 30.17% who are not 
involved civically in any other way.  
 
Table 1. Types of Participation, Immigrants 
Type of participation % of immigrants involved 
Civic participation 
of which 
48.14 
     trade union membership 39.96 
 party membership 4.91 
 working for a political party or an action group 7.56 
 working for another similar organization or association 23.49 
 signing petition 48.31 
 taking part in a lawful demonstration 19.62 
 boycotting certain products 37.96 
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Further, the average values for these variables are constructed from the ESS separately 
for immigrants and for natives, by country: the rate of trade union membership, the rate of party 
membership, etc, and the rate of civic participation in general. To draw the parallel with the 
participation rates of natives in host countries, Table A6 focuses on a destination country. From 
this table, Sweden and Norway are the countries with highest civic participation rates of natives. 
At the same time, immigrants in these countries are also the most active as compared to 
immigrants in other European countries2. Countries with lowest participation rates of natives are 
Greece, Portugal, and Hungary; and also in Hungary there are the lowest participation rates of 
immigrants. Figure A1 illustrates a high degree of positive correlation between participation of 
natives and immigrants by country. 
In addition, the World Values Survey (WVS) is used to construct home country 
participation rates for immigrants. The WVS is conducted in four waves since 1981 and covers 
more than 80 countries. I work with the last round of the WVS (years 1999-2002). WVS 
contains the same set of questions on participation and civic involvement of various types as the 
ESS, allowing to create synchronized measures of participation in countries that are home 
countries to immigrants from ESS. Table A7 of the Appendix provides summary statistics of 
participation rates with the focus on the source country. Out of 54 emigration countries in the 
sample the lowest rates of civic participation of non-migrants in origin countries are in Turkey 
(0.186), while the highest are, again, in Sweden (0.945). At the same time, comparing the 
behaviour of immigrants and their country nationals at home, it is difficult to see immediately 
whether there is a selection of immigrants in terms of participation. For example, immigrants 
from Turkey are much more active than their country nationals (rate of civic participation is 
0.460), as well as Moroccans (0.481 abroad versus 0.211 at home), while immigrants from 
Russia and Albania, who are among the largest immigration groups in the sample, are less active 
than their country nationals.  
 
VI. Empirical Strategy and Results 
4.1. Determinants of Civic Participation. Home or Host Culture? 
I start the empirical analysis by exploring what determines civic participation and its 
various forms, and to what extent home countries’ participation cultures affect participation of 
those who migrated.  
First, the following model is estimated: 
                                                 
2  I checked that Swedish in Norway and Norwegians in Sweden represent no more than 5% of the corresponding  
immigrant population. 
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Participijk = β0 + β1 Xi + β2 HomeParticipk + εijk ,  (1) 
  
where Participijk is a measure of civic participation coded on a 0-1 basis of an individual i 
residing in country j who migrated from country k. Xi is a set of individual socio-economic 
characteristics, and HomeParticipk is the average participation rate in the home country. Probit 
estimation is chosen because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. 
Individual socio-economic characteristics considered are the number of members in a 
household, age, age squared, gender, years of completed education, whether an individual is 
married, been divorced, individual income, being an employee and being unemployed. A prior 
expectation would be that the level of civic engagement increases with age but at a decreasing 
rate, and that the larger number of years of schooling would enhance participation. The latter is 
due to the fact that individuals with more education are more likely to have stronger interest in 
and knowledge about the working of civic society, as well as about their rights and opportunities 
for participation (Bueker, 2005). 
Individual income is expected to have positive impact on participation, as it may serve as 
a resource for participation. Also, higher income may signify that an immigrant has a more stable 
position in a society and can also devote more time to participation. Likewise, employees would 
be expected to participate more than self-employed and employed in family business (with 
respect to trade union membership, though, higher participation of employees would be for the 
reason of a more immediate access to these structures). Unemployed immigrants would be 
expected to have less resources to devote to participation. 
Two area characteristics are also included, as it has been shown that area heterogeneity 
and neighbourhoods play an important role in determining certain behavioural outcomes 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Borjas, 1992). These are mean area income (calculated on a 
regional rather than country basis), and a dummy equal to one if an immigrant lives in urban 
rather than rural area. 
Table 2.1 summarizes estimation results. All specifications include correction of standard 
errors for clustering at the country of origin level, since the major variable of interest varies with 
the country of origin only3. Column one contains marginal effects of the baseline specification. 
As expected, propensity to participate rises with age but at a decreasing rate, as well as with the 
number of completed years of schooling. There is some weak evidence that females tend to 
participate less than males. Those with higher incomes are more likely to be civically involved in 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, clustering at the country of destination was also applied, for overall similar results.  
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some way. Potential endogeneity problem with the income variable is most likely not to be too 
severe, as I consider the types of participation of political and civic rather than directly economic 
character, and also because there may be not only “individual”, but also “social” benefits from 
such involvement (La Ferrara, 2002; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). Working as employees 
(versus self-employed and employed in family business) leads to more participation, while 
unemployed are less civically active. In line with previous studies (such as Dustmann, 1996), 
being married has a negative impact on participation, as it arguably makes it less stimulating for 
an immigrant to plunge into a life of a receiving society and to assimilate. However, this result is 
not robust as will be shown further. Living in urban areas seems to present better opportunities 
for civic engagement too, while mean area income does not seem to play a role.  
The major variable of my interest, home country rate of civic participation, exhibits a 
positive statistically significant effect on civic participation of those who migrated. Starting at 
the sample mean and using the corresponding coefficient from probit estimation, I calculate that 
an increase in the level of home country participation rate (across countries) by one standard 
deviation is associated with an increase in the probability of civic participation in a destination 
country by 2.61 percentage points, which also accounts for approximately 13% of the variation 
in home country participation across countries of origin. This suggests that participation culture 
of a home country is transmitted in the form of higher civic participation abroad. This is also in 
line with the idea that high culture of civic involvement at home generates experiences that can 
be built on and can be considered as a resource that determines further participation (Vogel and 
Triandafyllidou, 2006). 
[insert Table 2.1 about here] 
Additionally, to disentangle the home country effect for different forms of participation, 
Table 2.2 shows the same regression estimated separately for each form of participation. Here, 
dependent variables are coded on a zero-one basis if an individual takes part in a certain activity 
(such as trade union membership, working for an organization, etc); independent variables of 
interest are corresponding rates of participation in the same activities in home countries. The 
most robust effect that holds almost for all types of participation is that of education and income, 
and it is those more educated and more well-off who tend to participate more in all types of 
activities, except trade unions. For trade union outcomes, it is being an employee (versus self-
employed or working for a family business) and employed, as well as a relatively older male, 
that increases the probability of becoming of trade union member. Unemployment status also 
precludes from becoming a party member and from signing petitions. 
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As to the home country effect, it matters for certain types of participation, but not for all. 
Moreover, home participating culture may have positive as well as negative impact on different 
forms of participation of immigrants. For example, those who come from strong cultures of trade 
unions, boycotting products and signing petitions, tend to carry higher participation propensities 
in these activities across borders. However, there is a mild evidence that working for a party at 
home translates even into negative propensity to work for a party abroad. Explanations for the 
negative impact of home practises may be found in Bueker (2005), who argues that unpleasant 
previous experiences that resulted in disappointments or fear of governmental structures and 
processes do translate into lower participation, while positive experiences do not necessarily 
result in more participation. This is the case of working for a party, which also might have been 
imposed in certain countries of origin (such as the countries of former Communist Block) rather 
than stemmed from a voluntary choice, hence, as a result, party work is renounced in the 
immigration country. At the same time, either a direct experience of growing up in a culture with 
high rates of party membership, demonstrating, and participating to other organizations, or 
looking backwards and observing high participation in such activities at home, does not 
significantly affect participation of immigrants in these activities abroad. The insignificant home 
country effect for organizational participation may be due to the fact that many immigrants are 
involved in migrants’ associations of various types (see POLITIS Reports 2006), while this form 
of civic involvement is irrelevant for them back at home. Some of the insignificant results here, 
however, may also technically stem from the fact that dependent variables (such as party 
membership) contain too many zeros (only 2.36% of respondents are party members). Thus, for 
a more meaningful analysis, I continue working with the measure of civic participation that 
equals to one if an individual undertakes at least one of the activities. 
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
In the next columns of Table 2.1 I explore other specifications of equation (1). In column 
2, three more variables are added: language proficiency (a dummy equal to one if an individual 
mentions any official language of a country of residence, or English, among languages spoken at 
home), a dummy equal to one for individuals who have one of the parents being a national of the 
country of residence, and a dummy equal to one if an immigrant has the citizenship of the 
country of residence. From column 2, there is little evidence that language ability enhances 
participation, even though this may be due to the data sampling and the fact that interviewees 
were able to answer the questionnaire without the help of an interpreter, thus possessing at least a 
minimum knowledge of the country of residence language. On the other hand, naturalization 
clearly improves participation outcomes. This is in line with the idea that acquiring citizenship 
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“relaxes the constraints” by which immigrants are bound, allowing them to become full-fledged 
members of the hosting society (for example, in Estonia, membership to political parties is 
restricted only to nationals of Estonia, while in Austria third-country nationals may participate to 
demonstrations, but not organize them; Cyrus et al, 2006). At the same time, being a citizen may 
additionally suggest that an individual has spent a significant amount of time in the country, 
gained a permanent view on her stay, and thus became aware of and interested in opportunities 
for civic engagement4.  
Column 3 explores whether educational attainment of parents and of the partner may play 
a role (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005), but there is no evidence for that. The degree of home country 
civic participation is robust to both these specifications. 
In column 4, I include more labour market individual characteristics. These are total 
hours worked per week including the overtime (I expect that those who work longer hours would 
have less time to devote to civic engagement), the skill level, and the sector in which an 
individual works. Four broad occupational categories are distinguished: manufacturing and 
construction, agriculture, trade and services, and caring for individuals (the latter being among 
the top occupation for migrant women). Excluded category is all other occupations (such as 
governmental workers, teachers and medical doctors). These variables are constructed from the 
ESS survey question on individual’s occupation, which is coded based on ISO standard for 
occupations. From the same question I construct variables for being a skilled or an unskilled 
worker (I also experimented with constructing variables such as “white collar” and “blue collar”; 
“management”, “non-profit sector” etc for similar results). Overall, there is no evidence that 
skilled or unskilled workers differ significantly in their degree of civic involvement. At the same 
time, there is a clear distinction by sectors. Those working in agriculture and trade and services 
participate significantly less, perhaps, due to rather limited opportunities for collective action as 
compared to those who work in other sectors, but also due to a lower degree of unionization of 
these sectors. However, there is no evidence that those involved in construction and 
manufacturing, where unionization is higher, or caring for other people, exhibit more civic 
participation than others.  
Finally, in the last column of Table 2, I add a second variable of interest, the host country 
rate of civic participation, and estimate the following specification: 
                                                 
4 The importance of naturalization is well documented in the labour economics literature. Chiswick (1978) pioneers 
the area of research on naturalization’s implication for immigrant assimilation in terms of earnings, finding that 
American naturalized foreign-born males earn more than non- naturalized, but that the effect of naturalization 
becomes smaller once years since migration are taken into account. More recently, Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 
(2002) find that naturalization accelerates the process of assimilation in terms of earnings, and has an impact beyond 
and above mere “length of stay” effect. Significant impact of naturalization remains even when they control for 
individual unobserved characteristics that may lead to self-selection of the most able towards acquiring citizenship.   
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Participijk = β0 + β1 Xi + β2 HomeParticipk + β3 HostParticipj + εijk ,  (2) 
 
where all variables are like in (1), and, additionally, HostParticipj is the level of civic 
participation of natives in the destination country.  
Is it the home or the host culture of participation that affects individual participation of 
immigrants? From the last column of Table 2, I find evidence in support of a hypothesis that 
higher participation outcomes of natives translate into higher participation outcomes of 
immigrants too, with the marginal effect of host country participation rate having the largest 
magnitude in this specification. The host country effect is stronger and larger that the home one. 
Using the estimated probit coefficients from this regression, I compute that, starting from the 
sample mean, an increase of one standard deviation in home participation rate (across countries 
of origin) leads to 2.49 percentage points increase in the probability of civic involvement, while 
an increase of one standard deviation in host country participation rate (across countries of 
destination) is associated with a 20.91 percentage points increase in the probability of civic 
involvement, that is, more than an eight-fold effect. To appreciate the size of this effect even 
more, compare it to acquisition of citizenship: naturalization increases the probability of civic 
involvement by 9.43 percentage points, which is one of the most sizeable effects, but which is 
still twice as small as the effect of the destination country’s participation culture.  
At this point I find no evidence that the host country participating culture crowds out the 
home effect. A transnational mechanism seems to be in place, according to which immigrants 
develop various forms of belonging, identities, and transmigrants’ community building, relating 
both to the home and host societies (see literature on transnationalism, such as Glick Schiller, 
Basch, Blanc-Szanton, 1992). 
The next question to ask is whether the length of stay, as well as the age at migration and 
migration cohorts matter. The following section addresses these questions.  
 
4.2. Immigrants Compared to Natives. Assimilation versus Culture Transmission 
In this section I address the differences between immigrants and natives with respect to 
participation. Also, I evaluate the importance of age, cohort, and assimilation effects for 
immigrants’ participation.  
To start with, Table 3, columns 1-2 offer a comparison of participation outcomes of 
natives (column 1) and of immigrants (column 2), where for comparability only individual and 
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area characteristics are included. These are the same as in Table 2 column 5, with additionally 
included dummy variables for religion denomination5.  
First, note some differences in the impact of individual characteristics on natives and on 
immigrants when determining participation. As expected, immigrants’ years of schooling have a 
slightly lower effect on participation than the years of schooling of natives, differences being due 
to the country-specific aspects of schooling (Chiswick, 1978). With respect to income, the 
positive effect is twice as high for natives as for immigrants. The probability of being civically 
inactive is almost twice as high for unemployed immigrants as for unemployed natives, 
suggesting that unemployment spells have more severe overall implication for immigrants than 
for natives. The number of household members does not seem to play a role for immigrants’ 
participation, while its increasing number impedes participation of natives. Of note is a lower 
propensity to participate among both Catholic natives and immigrants, while there is no strong 
evidence for participation differences among other denominations: natives with Orthodox 
denomination tend to be slightly more civically active, but it is immigrants with Protestant 
denomination who exhibit more participation. There is no evidence that Muslims, Jews, and 
other Christians participate significantly differently from an average immigrant or native. 
Furthermore, there are some differences by the employment sector: immigrants employed in 
agriculture are twice less likely to be civically involved than natives, who are also less prone to 
participate if they are working in this sector. At the same time, while immigrants in 
manufacturing and construction do not differ with respect to participation from the average, 
natives in these sectors are less active as well. Finally, if for natives participation outcomes do 
not seem to depend on the area of residence, immigrants in urban areas are more active that those 
in the rural ones.  
[insert Table 3 about here] 
I now complete the analysis by including lengths of stay and cohort effects for 
immigrants. Traditionally, the immigrant assimilation hypothesis has been investigated by 
considering whether the years since migration variable, or duration in the destination, matter for 
the immigrants’ adjustment. Most commonly, this has been done within the synthetic cohorts 
framework, originally proposed by Borjas (1985). Several studies (Blau, 1991; Borjas, 1996; 
Riphahn 1999) employed this methodology to identify separately age at migration, cohort, and 
overall assimilation effects, and showed that these effects have a strong prediction power for 
immigrant’s performance in the receiving country. The data at hand, which is a succession of 
                                                 
5 Home country average participation rate is not included for natives, as it would result in a reflection problem 
(Manski, 1993). For comparability, in Table 3 column 2 only, both home and host participation variables are omitted 
for immigrants too.  
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cross-sections (two waves of the ESS survey: 2002-2003, and 2004-2005) allow constructing a 
synthetic panel and capture the impact of age at migration, cohort effect (year of migration), and 
the assimilation effect (length of stay), in addition to the age variable. It should be noted that this 
methodology is superior to the use of simple cross section methodology (such as in Chiswick, 
1978), as it reduces the bias due to the static nature of a cross section. However, it has been 
recognized that the synthetic cohort approach also has its limitations in that it may contain 
survivor bias. Most recent studies have been relying on superior longitudinal data which allow 
overcoming the problem of survivors bias and cohort heterogeneity (for example, Hu, 2000). But 
even the longitudinal data are unable to overcome all problems, for example, to account for 
structural change in migration absorption (Beenstock, Chiswick and Paltiel, 2005). It has been 
also recognized that tests of assimilation with any data (cross-section, synthetic cohort, or panel), 
may not be ideal (Ibid). I proceed with the synthetic cohort approach bearing in mind above-
mentioned limitations when interpreting the results.  
Column 3 of Table 3 contains main results of this study. The length of stay in the country 
clearly plays a significant role in determining participation: those who have stayed more than 
five years in a country have an unambiguous inclination towards civic involvement. This is a 
much expected result, as more time spent in a destination country allows learning more about the 
opportunities for civic participation, receiving information about and participating to networks of 
natives and immigrants, acquiring more social capital (Liang, 1994; Van Londen and Phalet, 
2006), and developing a perspective of staying in a host country. The negative sign of the 
immigration year suggests that more recently arriving cohorts are less active, thus implying a 
declining “quality” (Borjas, 1996) of immigrants with respect to participation. This may also be 
an indirect evidence of the fact that recent arrivals are more due to economic rather than political 
reasons and are of a temporary rather than permanent character. At the same time, there is no 
evidence that age at migration significantly matters for participation: those who migrated in 
childhood or adolescence are neither more nor less active than those migrated at a later stage. In 
line with previous studies, such as Dustmann (1994), Chiswick (1991), language is also playing 
an important role in predicting immigrants’ outcomes in the destination country. 
Finally, all these effects taken into account, the insignificant coefficient of the home 
country average participation suggests that culture transmission is not robust to the inclusion of 
these effects, while culture assimilation with respect to participation, as suggested by the 
coefficients on the years in the host country and host country average participation, takes place. 
Host country participation is also jointly significant with the length of stay variables (joint 
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significant test’s statistic chi(10) = 66.93, Prob>chi2 = 0.000)6. The impact of the host culture is 
stronger and more robust than the impact of the home participating culture. The effect of an 
increase of one standard deviation of the host country’s participation rate (calculated starting 
from the sample mean and using coefficients of probit estimation such as in Table 3 column 3) 
on the probability of immigrants’ participation equals 15.79 percentage points. As expected, it is 
smaller than the effect I obtained when time and cohort effects were not taken into account, but 
still very sizeable. This effect compares only to the 17.3 percentage point decrease in probability 
of being civically active for immigrants who become employed in agricultural sector and to 10.8 
percentage point decrease for immigrants who become unemployed. Those who work as 
employees, ceteris paribus, have a 8.5 percentage points higher probability of becoming civically 
involved than those who work in family business or who are self-employed; an effect half the 
size of the effect of the host country’s participation culture. Citizenship acquisition raises the 
probability of civic participation by 6.4 percentage points, an effect almost two and a half times 
smaller than the host country’s participation influence. In practical terms, the effect of one 
standard deviation increase in the host country participation rate (across host countries) equal to 
15.79 percentage points increase in the probability of civic involvement means that, for example, 
an immigrant who chooses to go to France rather than to Hungary will have about 15 percentage 
points higher probability of engaging civically7. As another example, if among sampled 62234 
natives 6223 more individuals were involved civically across all sampled countries, the 
probability of civic engagement for any immigrant, ceteris paribus, would have been 10.21 
percentage points higher. 
 
V. Robustness 
In this section I explore further the robustness of the obtained results. I perform a 
sensitivity analysis under which certain immigrant groups are excluded from estimations; 
employ an alternative estimation technique; and address the issue of immigrants’ self-selection 
and reference groups. Table 4 contains this section’s results.  
 
5.1 Omitting Certain Groups of Immigrants 
One of the very interesting, but also problematic features of my sample is the fact that 
foreign-born individuals come from all over the world. Thus, I am comparing participation rates 
                                                 
6 I also considered a specification in which interaction terms between home, host culture and length of stay and age 
at migration were included. In such specification, interaction terms are insignificant, but independent terms have the 
same signs and similar magnitudes. Results are available upon request. 
7 Hungary has the rate of natives’ civic participation which is close to the mean rate across countries; France is about 
one standard deviation apart. 
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of Canadians and Moroccans, Swiss and Ukrainians, to name just a few groups. While 
distinguishing different migration patterns and migration histories is beyond the scope of this 
study, in this section I are attempting to insure comparability of immigrants and see whether 
previous results hold if certain immigrant groups are omitted. I considered one at a time 
exclusion of the following immigrant groups: those born in the EU countries and residing in the 
EU countries different from the country of birth; nationals of geographically European countries; 
nationals from post-communist regime countries; immigrants from predominantly non-Christian 
cultures. I also tried excluding those immigrants who came to live in a country more than 20 
years ago, obtaining quite comparable results. In Table 4 column 1 I present a probit estimation 
based on the sample where the omitted immigrant group is the one from industrialized countries: 
the EU-15, Switzerland, USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan. The resulting immigrant 
sample consists of 1,738 individuals. While most of the coefficients have magnitudes and signs 
as before, variables “being an employee” and “working in trade or services” lose significance. 
As before, culture assimilation, as captured by the length of stay and participation outcomes of 
natives, matters significantly for participation of immigrants. 
 [insert Table 4 about here]  
 
5.2 Alternative Estimation Technique: Using Count Data Model 
In the previous sections I worked with the dependent variable coded on a zero-one basis, 
where one meant involvement in any type of civic activity versus zero for non-involvement. 
Here, the idea is to consider an integer dependent variable, which is a count of the number of 
civic activities an individual undertakes (the distribution of the number of activities is 
summarized in Table A6). I fit the Poisson maximum-likelihood regression for the specification 
such as the one in the previous section (see Mayer and Riphahn (1999) for similar applications 
and elaboration on potential caveats)8. Table 4 column 2 contains regression results, as well as 
the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistics for this estimation which suggests that using Poisson model 
is justified. Comparing these results to Table 3 column 3 I see that, overall, there is a strong 
affinity between them, although the coefficients from the Poisson regression and the marginal 
effects from probit estimation are not directly comparable. Language variable gains significance, 
and host country participation continues playing an important role in predicting civic 
participation outcomes of immigrants.  
 
5.3 Accounting for Immigrants’ Self-Selection:  Matching on Propensity Score 
                                                 
8  Ordered probit was also considered, for almost identical results which are available on request. 
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Up till now I have been working with average participation rates by country of origin and 
by country of destination. A major objection to this is that the average level of observed 
compatriots’ participation back at home, as well of the natives in general, may be of limited 
relevance for immigrants. As immigrants may be self-selected in terms of participation, their 
reference group is most probably that part of the society from which they originate rather than 
the home society at large. In the same fashion, a reference group may be a part of the host 
society, rather than the whole society. Thus, the major robustness check concerns with the issue 
of representability of an immigrant’s reference group. The idea here is to construct relevant 
reference participation rates for each immigrant, by groups of similar compatriots and of similar 
natives, rather than by country of origin and a host country as a whole. Thus, for example, if an 
immigrant is an educated female in her fifties, an ideal reference group would be a pool of 
educated females in their fifties back at home. In addition to being more appropriate, 
consideration of participating rates based on reference groups also increases variation of the 
variable in question.   
Appropriate reference groups of compatriots who did not migrate are created by matching 
immigrants (of the ESS) to the compatriots (from the WVS) with similar characteristics. The 
match is performed on the propensity scores, using the matching method standard in the 
evaluation literature. The idea behind matching is the comparison of outcomes (in this case, civic 
participation) of treated and control groups (in this case, migrants and non-migrants), who are as 
similar as possible. But since matching individuals on n-dimensional vector of characteristics is 
hardly feasible for large n, characteristics of individuals of each group are summarized into a 
single-index variable, called propensity score, and matching is performed on this variable 
(Becker and Ichino, 20029). An advantage of using matching as a solution for self-selection 
problem is that there is no assumption put on whether migrants are self-selected from the lower 
or from the higher end of the participation outcomes distribution.   
First, for each country of origin, emigrants (from the ESS) and non-emigrants (from the 
WVS) are pooled together, and a conditional probability (propensity score) of receiving a 
treatment (immigration) given pre-treatment characteristics is calculated. The sample is further 
split into equally spaced intervals of the propensity score, and within each interval it is ensured 
that the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ. Also, within each 
interval, it is tested that the means of each characteristic do not differ between treated and control 
units, that is, a necessary condition for the balancing hypothesis is ensured10 (for details of the 
                                                 
9 I also work with pscore.ado program for Stata written by Becker and Ichino. 
10 Technically, reference groups created in this way contain individuals with different characteristics but with the 
same or close values of the propensity scores, rather than individuals with exactly the same characteristics. 
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methodology, see Becker and Ichino, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; and Imbens, 2000). 
Once the most comparable sample counterparts are selected from the group of non-emigrants for 
each emigrant, average participation rates are calculated by groups of non-emigrants with similar 
characteristics. In practical terms this amounts to calculating averages by blocks, or intervals, 
within which the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ.  
Matching migrants, for whom the data come from the ESS, to their compatriots, the data 
for whom come from the WVS, requires a lot of prior data refining and ensuring data 
comparability. For example, the WVS contains information on educational attainment, which is 
coded differently from the educational attainment reported in the ESS. Thus, for comparability, 
two variables were constructed: a dummy equal to one if an individual had any amount of 
schooling not higher than completed high school, and a dummy equal to one if an individual 
received any amount of university or college education (educational group being left out is 
individuals with vocational training). Also, to ensure that a match is found for all migrants, three 
age groups were created: individuals below twenty-five years of age, from twenty-five to forty-
five, and above forty-five (other alternative groups were considered, but the best matches are 
found if the sample is split into these three age groups). Unfortunately, ESS contains almost no 
information on pre-migration characteristics, thus making impossible the match of individuals 
from rural/urban areas or on income/social class characteristics (matching on current incomes 
does not seem to be appropriate). Finally, as there are fifty-four countries of origin in the sample, 
various propensity score specifications were tried, with the idea that the balancing property 
should uniformly hold for the same propensity score specification across all countries. Given 
these data and comparability limitations, the estimated propensity score specification is quite 
parsimonious, and includes only age, gender, and education parameters. Other individual 
characteristics, such as marital status, were considered in the specification, but they fail to 
produce propensity scores satisfying the balancing property in all countries of the sample. For an 
example of propensity score estimation and average participation rates of non-emigrants 
calculated within propensity score blocks, see Appendix, Table A8.  
As a result of matching, each immigrant was assigned a specific reference participation 
rate of compatriots, depending on his or her individual characteristics. To appreciate the 
difference, if previously used value of home participation average was 0.444 for all Albanian 
immigrants, matching resulted in assigning four different values to four groups of Albanian 
immigrants, ranging from 0.297 to 0.578, depending on their age, gender, and education. 
In the same fashion, each immigrant was matched to similar natives in destination 
countries and participation rates by groups of similar immigrants/natives were constructed. For 
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comparability, the propensity score specification was chosen to be the same as in the 
emigrants/non-leavers match, and included age, gender, and education parameters. 
Table 4 column 3 presents estimation results. Here, home and host participation rates are 
those calculated based on the propensity score matching. As these variables have been generated 
through regression analysis (propensity score specification), for this regression bootstrapping is 
applied in order to ensure proper inferences and to cope with the generated regressors’ problem; 
hence, bootstrapped standard errors are reported. The results presented in previous sections stand 
to this robustness check: recalculated coefficients are all very similar to those observed before. 
Home country participation rates remain insignificant. Host participation rates continue playing 
an important role in determining participation outcomes of immigrants. The coefficient on this 
variable is smaller in magnitude than before, which is not a very much expected result, however, 
its significance and the same sign point out to its robustness to the use of this alternative 
technique.  
 
VI. Home and Host Country Effects 
Finally, in this section I investigate how other country effects may influence individual 
participation outcomes, as well as address another critique of the previous analysis regarding the 
inclusion of participation rates by country into regressions. The concern is that, included in the 
individual-level regressions, these rates require the relationship between the home and the host 
country effects and the individual participation outcomes be linear, and may not only reflect the 
true effect of home and host participation culture, but rather pick up all other unobservable 
country characteristics. On the other hand, however, including only dummies for the countries of 
origin does not allow distinguishing between various country effects. For example, in addition to 
participating culture and previous civic experiences, country dummies may also capture the 
“reversibility” of migration: if re-migration is complicated for political, geographical, or other 
reasons, this may have an impact on integration decision of individuals (Bueker, 2005). In order 
to investigate country effects in depth, the following solution can be implemented: first use 
country dummies in estimations, and then regress the coefficients obtained on country dummies 
on home country indicators (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005; Blau, 1991). The analysis in this paper 
is complicated by the fact that there are two reference countries: home and host, while the 
proposed two-steps procedure can be used to analyse the country effects of one set of countries 
at a time. Thus, I first proceed with the analysis of home country effects, and then repeat the 
procedure for a similar analysis of host-country effects. The two-step estimation is performed as 
follows. First, estimate a model such as:  
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Participijk = β0 + β1 Xi + β2 dj  + β3 dk + εijk    (3) 
where dk is a dummy for a country of origin; dj is a country of destination, other variables are 
like in (1). And second, estimate 
β3k = α + δ1HomeParticipk + δ2Yk + εk     (4) 
where β3k is a vector of home country dummy coefficients obtained in the previous step, and Yk 
is a set of other potentially relevant country characteristics.  
To start with, of interest is to include only the civic participation rates by country of 
origin in the second stage, in order to understand how much of the variation in the overall home 
country effects is explained by the civic participation rates. Further, of interest is also to include 
other potentially important country characteristics and see whether they have any impact on the 
participation outcomes of immigrants. In particular, I control for the GDP per capita, secondary 
school enrolment rates11, migration rates (net migration rates per 1000 of population, average 
2000-2005), and whether the sending country is industrialized or not (similar characteristics are 
considered in Blau, 1991). Also, I control for religious diversity of a country by including an 
index of religious fragmentation (Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) show that participation in social 
activities is lower in more fragmented racial and ethnic communities; Bisin, Topa, and Verdier 
(2004), focus on the importance of religion as a transmitted feature). Lastly, previous research 
has shown the value of institutions and political practises of societies with respect to 
participation. For example, Finifter and Finifter (1989) argue that higher rates of participation are 
found among those immigrants who had previous exposure to democratic systems, while 
Fennema and Tillie (1999) suggest that bad previous experiences may generate lack of trust in 
the government and impede participation even after migration. Thus, I also include an 
empowerment rights index, which is an aggregate index of freedom of movement, freedom of 
speech, degree of protection of workers’ rights, political participation, and freedom of religion 
indicators (I tried to include these indices separately, but due to high degree of collinearity 
between them most of the coefficients are rendered insignificant). For data definitions and 
sources, see Table A112. 
The starting point is Table 5-1, with the decomposition of home country effects. Results 
for the equation (3) are in panel A. After controlling for all individual characteristics and for the 
country of residence, for certain countries, though not for all, countries’ effect continues bearing 
                                                 
11 I also considered literacy rates for similar results. Even though I are aware of the recently proposed measures of 
labour force quality based on the international mathematics and science scores (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000), I am  
unable to use them as they are not available for all countries of the sample.   
12 Only most recent values of home country variables are used. Ideally, I should have used the values at the time of 
migration, but collecting such data is complicated as immigrants come from 54 countries at different times, and 
much of the data would be missing.  
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importance in determining immigrants’ participation (panel A). Only some origin-specific 
dummies are significant, but all of them are significant jointly.  
[insert Table 5-1 about here] 
Panel B contains results for the second step of the estimation, (4). To cope with the small 
sample size problem and its implication for inferences, standard errors were bootstrapped using 
normal approximation method; number of bootstrap replications being 1000. In the first column, 
only the host country average participation rates are included in estimation. The coefficient of 
home participation is highly significant, and pseudo R2 for this regression is 0.14, suggesting 
that a relatively high proportion of the variation in the home country dummy coefficients is 
explained by home participation rates (for similar inferences, see Fernandez and Fogli, 2005). 
This also serves as a justification for including average participation rates into the individual 
regressions of the previous sections. Figure A2 of the Appendix provides a regression fit 
corresponding to column 1 of Panel B, showing which countries lie above and below the 
regression line, and which ones fit into the 95% confidence interval of this estimation. Low 
home country participation has especially severe implications for participation of immigrants 
from countries such as Ukraine, Albania, Russia, while high participation rates in countries such 
as Finland and Switzerland translate into higher participation abroad.   
In column 2, other country characteristics are included. Overall fit highly improves. 
There is little evidence, however, to the fact that civic freedoms at home, higher enrolment rates 
or higher GDP per capita improve participation outcomes. In contrast, it is revealed that most 
active immigrants come from industrialized countries which are also immigration countries (with 
positive migration rates). Coming from a country with high religious fragmentation has a 
negative impact on participation outcomes.  
In trying to understand further these results, I analysed correlation between country 
variables, and found that civic freedoms variable is highly correlated with the variable 
“industrialized”, and with GDP per capita. All in all, the “absence” of the significant coefficient 
on home country participation rates is a result in itself, as it suggests that culture transmission in 
terms of participation is not happening. At the same time, other country of origin characteristics 
continue determining participation outcomes of migrants, and most participating are those from 
industrialized immigration societies (which are more likely also those with higher GDP per 
capita and higher respect for civic freedoms), and which are not highly fragmentised religiously.  
[insert Table 5-2 about here] 
 
The same analysis is repeated for the destination country effects. I estimate: 
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Participijk = β0 + β1 Xi + β2 dj  + β3 dk + εijk    (5) 
 
where dk is a dummy for a country of origin; dj is a dummy for a country of destination, other 
variables are like in (1). And further, estimate 
β2j = α + δ1HostParticipj + δ2Yj + εj     (6) 
In parallel with (3), vector Yj is a vector of host country characteristics, which include 
GDP per capita, migration rates (net migration rates per 1000 of population, average 2000-2005), 
religious diversity, and empowerment rights index. In this estimation, secondary school 
enrolment and a dummy for whether a country is industrialized are omitted because of the lack 
of cross-country variation in these indicators. 
Results are presented in Table 5-2. In a similar fashion, many but not all country dummy 
coefficients are significant (panel A), and all are significant jointly, suggesting that host country 
setting also impacts participation outcomes of immigrants (see also Figure A2 for the regression 
fit). Panel B, column 1, shows that the host country culture of participation matters for 
participation of immigrants. The coefficient on the observed natives participation is significant 
and very large in magnitude. In addition, this variable alone explains 86% of the variation in the 
host country dummy coefficient, suggesting that immigrants do pick up on the participating 
culture of the society in which they live. Likewise, it is the sole significant variable in a 
regression where other country variables are included (column 2). This coefficient stays robust to 
the inclusion of the host country degree of civic freedoms, suggesting that for immigrants, 
observed behaviour of natives is more important than the regime lived through. Neither civic 
freedoms in the receiving countries, nor GDP per capita, degree of religious fragmentation or net 
migration seem to influence the behaviour of immigrants, rather, the effect of these variables, if 
any, works through the civic behaviour of natives – and by observing what natives do, 
immigrants tend to do the same.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
Various studies recently have shown that the quality of public life and the strength of 
democracy depend on the strength of the civic involvement, but also that the participation of 
individuals in the life of their communities has been decreasing over the past. At the same time, 
as the proportion of immigrants is growing, it is the immigrants who increasingly determine the 
scope, shape, and directions of the civic life of receiving communities. In addition, it is also the 
electorate that is becoming less representative of native population (Kollwelter, 2005).  
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Thus, the research on civic participation of immigrants bears twofold importance. On the 
one hand, it can help understanding how current civic participation of immigrants might 
predispose the future civic and political life of Europe. On the other hand, it can suggest the 
degree of current immigrants’ integration, civic assimilation, development of civic solidarity and 
interconnectedness between natives and immigrants.  
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to empirically assess civic 
participation outcomes of immigrants, and to understand what cultural mechanisms are at work 
during the formation of civic participation outcomes. Methodologically standing in line with the 
literature on the processes of culture transmission and immigrants’ assimilation in terms of 
working hours, wages, and fertility, this paper broadens our understanding of yet another type of 
immigrants’ behaviour in receiving societies – their civic involvement. The major findings can 
be summarized as follows.  
First, of note is the fact that factors determining participation vary depending on the type 
of civic engagement. While, for example, trade union membership, signing petitions and 
boycotting products abroad is positively linked to the level of similar activities at home, it is not 
the case for other forms of participation. Moreover, higher levels of involvement with parties in 
home countries may translate into lower propensity to participate in parties abroad, suggesting 
that potential negative experiences with these structures in home societies discourage further 
participation in them after migration. 
Second, when compared to natives, civic participation outcomes of immigrants are 
determined by rather similar factors. The main difference is that unemployment has twice as 
negative effect on immigrants as on natives when it comes to participation, while income 
increase for immigrants has twice as lower impact on participation as income increase for 
natives. Immigrants’ years of schooling have a slightly lower effect on participation than the 
years of schooling of natives, too. 
There is a strong evidence that naturalization enhances overall propensity to participate 
civically. Citizenship acquisition relaxes participation constrains, offers more possibilities and 
opportunities for involvement, and at the same time signifies that an immigrant spent a 
considerable amount of time in a country, developed a prospect of staying in it, and acquired 
social capital necessary for participation. Indeed, another strong finding is that regardless of the 
age at migration, the longer an individual stays in a country, the more he or she is prone to be 
civically involved.  
Educated, relatively better off, and employed individuals are also more ready to devote 
time and energy to civic activities. Potentially, they are also those who have more stability in the 
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receiving society, as well as more resources, such as time and energy, to devote to such 
activities. Being an employee (rather than self-employed or employed in family business), 
creates more opportunities for collective action (especially trade union membership) and thus 
enhances participation too, although this is true only for the employees coming form 
industrialized countries. At the same time, there is no difference in participation outcomes 
between low-skilled and highly-skilled workers. Also, while agriculture, trade and services 
workers participate less (again, perhaps, due to less opportunities for collective action and due to 
lower unionisation of these sectors), there is no evidence that those in manufacturing and 
construction tend to participate more. Thus, when there are less opportunities for participation, 
participation is impeded, but when such opportunities are more readily available, it is not 
necessarily enhanced. 
  When delving deeper into testing culture transmission and culture assimilation 
hypothesis, I find only limited evidence in support of the hypothesis of culture transmission in 
terms of participation. Consequently, neither is transnationalism strong enough. Much stronger 
and much more robust is the effect of participation assimilation, which takes place along with the 
overall assimilation of immigrants. On the other hand, this does not signify that home country 
does not play any role in determining participation outcomes. To the contrary, there is evidence 
that it is those from industrialized, net immigration countries, where the degree of religious 
fragmentation is low, and, potentially, civic freedoms are more respected, who tend to be more 
civically active. Thus, an interesting conclusion is that, while participating culture per se is not 
translated across borders, it is the experience of living in a less (more) economically and 
democratically advanced country, which potentially generates lower (higher) trust in the working 
of the civic society and leads to lower (higher) active civic engagement at home, that is carried 
across the borders. In contrast, it is the behaviour of natives, rather than economic and political 
regime lived through, that seems to have the strongest impact on immigrants’ participation. It is 
by observing by what natives do, that immigrants tend to do the same. 
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Table 2.1. Determinants of Civic Participation: Basic Probit Analysis 
Dep. Var: Civic Participation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of people in a HH 0.016* 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Years of schooling 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.038 -0.045** -0.074*** -0.032 -0.028 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
Married -0.077*** -0.070** -0.192*** -0.056* -0.047* 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.054) (0.030) (0.026) 
Divorced or separated -0.033 -0.033 -0.048 -0.035 -0.058 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.093) (0.045) (0.041) 
Income 0.014** 0.012** 0.010 0.007 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Employee 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.151*** 0.038 0.046* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (0.026) 
Unemployed -0.109*** -0.112*** -0.110** -0.130*** -0.141*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
Mean area income 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.069*** -0.030 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
Living in an urban area 0.024 0.028 0.007 0.036* 0.035* 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) 
Home civic participation rate 0.127* 0.169** 0.160* 0.138* 0.121* 
 (0.069) (0.076) (0.083) (0.074) (0.065) 
Language ability  -0.003 0.054 0.011 0.049 
  (0.031) (0.039) (0.036) (0.031) 
Parents born in country  0.029 0.063 0.022 0.031 
  (0.036) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) 
Citizen  0.139*** 0.153*** 0.131*** 0.094*** 
  (0.027) (0.036) (0.027) (0.021) 
Total hours worked (week)    -0.001 -0.000 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufacturing/Construction    -0.104 -0.095 
    (0.093) (0.097) 
Agriculture    -0.216*** -0.212** 
    (0.084) (0.084) 
Trade/Services    -0.063* -0.077** 
    (0.033) (0.034) 
Carer    -0.029 -0.035 
    (0.040) (0.039) 
Skilled worker    0.082 0.072 
    (0.088) (0.091) 
Unskilled worker    0.074 0.071 
    (0.099) (0.104) 
Partner's education   0.015   
   (0.013)   
Father's education   -0.018   
   (0.011)   
Mother's education   0.007   
   (0.012)   
Host Civic Participation     1.180*** 
     (0.132) 
Wald(df) chi2 / PseudoR (13)247.96/0.08 (16)297.53/0.09 (19)300.35/0.11 (23)386.86/0.09 24(830)/0.13 
Observations 2961 2956 1729 2624 2624 
Reported are marginal effects of probit estimations, standard errors in parentheses; standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the country of origin and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significance at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.  
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Table 2.2. Determinants of Various Types of Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Var: TU Member Party Member Work for 
Party 
Work for an 
Association 
Signing 
Petitions 
Demonst- 
rations 
Boycotting 
Products 
Age 0.031*** -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HH members 0.009 -0.003 -0.000 0.004 0.001 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Education 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Female -0.073*** -0.010 0.002 0.009 0.031 -0.017 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) 
Married -0.005 -0.001 -0.011 -0.022 -0.033 -0.028 -0.073*** 
 (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) 
Divorced 0.035 0.005 0.007 -0.013 0.049 0.014 0.010 
 (0.033) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.031) (0.022) (0.029) 
Income 0.009 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.006** 0.016*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Employee 0.181*** -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 0.020 -0.011 
 (0.024) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) 
Unemployed -0.093*** -0.018*** 0.003 -0.005 -0.062** -0.012 -0.039 
 (0.026) (0.005) (0.017) (0.025) (0.031) (0.018) (0.024) 
Home TU 
membership 
0.334* 
(0.190) 
      
Home Party 
membership 
 -0.065 
(0.063) 
     
Home Working 
for a Party 
  -0.201* 
(0.111) 
    
Home Working 
for organizations 
   -0.083 
(0.073) 
   
Home Signing 
Petitions 
    0.234*** 
(0.046) 
  
Home 
Demonstrating 
     0.036 
(0.043) 
 
Home Boycotting 
Products 
      0.613*** 
(0.175) 
Wald(df) chi2 (11)234.49 (11) 45.99 (11) 53.20 (11) 103.75 (11)200.07 (11)45.83 (11)417.44 
PseudoR 0.087 0.049 0.037 0.058 0.077 0.025 0.085 
Observations 2961 2707 2737 2734 2930 2933 2928 
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Table 3. Immigrants versus Natives. Culture Transmission or Assimilation?  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var: Civic Participation Natives Immigrants Immigrants: Assimilation Characteristics 
Individual characteristics       
Number of hh members -0.010**  (0.005) 0.012 (0.010) 0.008 (0.010) 
Age  0.019*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.006) 0.015** (0.008) 
Age squared -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Years of schooling 0.022*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.003) 
Female -0.044*** (0.015) -0.039* (0.021) -0.034 (0.023) 
Married 0.016** (0.008) -0.048 (0.031) -0.040 (0.034) 
Divorced/separated 0.034*** (0.012) -0.042 (0.041) -0.054 (0.038) 
Income 0.025*** (0.006) 0.013** (0.005) 0.010** (0.005) 
Employee 0.075*** (0.017) 0.078** (0.031) 0.085*** (0.031) 
Unemployed -0.060*** (0.023) -0.119*** (0.040) -0.108*** (0.039) 
Protestant 0.018 (0.012) 0.071* (0.037) 0.074* (0.041) 
Catholic -0.055** (0.025) -0.036* (0.020) -0.038* (0.022) 
Eastern Orthodox 0.051* (0.028) -0.024 (0.034) -0.004 (0.033) 
Muslim 0.044 (0.043) -0.032 (0.035) -0.024 (0.044) 
Jew -0.005 (0.091) 0.019 (0.179) -0.005 (0.177) 
Other Christian 0.031 (0.028) -0.045 (0.047) -0.026 (0.044) 
Skilled worker 0.031 (0.022) 0.047 (0.088) 0.075 (0.094) 
Unskilled worker 0.033 (0.029) 0.025 (0.101) 0.047 (0.107) 
Manufacturing/construction -0.074*** (0.020) -0.066 (0.090) -0.078 (0.095) 
Agriculture -0.088*** (0.026) -0.194*** (0.072) -0.173** (0.075) 
Trade/services -0.065*** (0.010) -0.062* (0.033) -0.066** (0.033) 
Carer -0.034 (0.021) -0.009 (0.038) -0.009 (0.036) 
Area characteristics       
Mean area income -0.002 (0.013) -0.004 (0.040) -0.004 (0.039) 
Living in urban area 0.004 (0.012) 0.027* (0.014) 0.035** (0.014) 
Immigrant characteristics       
Years since migration: < 2     0.166 (0.203) 
Years since migration: 2-5     0.246 (0.168) 
Years since migration: 6-10     0.254* (0.135) 
Years since migration: 11-20     0.188* (0.105) 
Immigration year     -0.022** (0.009) 
Age at migration: <15     -0.231 (0.164) 
Age at migration: 15-25     -0.165 (0.130) 
Age at migration: 26-35     -0.132 (0.113) 
Age at migration: 36-45     -0.096 (0.087) 
Language ability     0.040* (0.024) 
Citizen      0.064*** (0.022) 
Home civic participation rate     0.082 (0.063) 
Host civic participation rate     0.883*** (0.338) 
Wald(df) chi2 / PseudoR (24) 8618.12 / 0.152 (24) 367.88 / 0.091 (37) 3935.45/ 0.144 
Observations 48559 2961 2939 
Marginal effects of probit estimations are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at 
the country of birth (for immigrants). Significance at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 4. Robustness 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Non-Industrialized Poisson PS Matching 
Individual characteristics       
Number of hh members -0.005 (0.012) 0.002 (0.023) 0.012 (0.011) 
Age  0.014 (0.012) 0.044** (0.018) 0.013* (0.007) 
Age squared -0.000*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Years of schooling 0.023*** (0.005) 0.047*** (0.005) 0.017*** (0.003) 
Female -0.046 (0.030) -0.046 (0.060) -0.031 (0.023) 
Married -0.043 (0.048) -0.068 (0.077) -0.052* (0.032) 
Divorced/separated -0.081** (0.041) 0.055 (0.086) -0.048 (0.039) 
Income 0.015** (0.007) 0.039*** (0.012) 0.008 (0.005) 
Employee 0.074 (0.057) 0.178*** (0.064) 0.076*** (0.029) 
Unemployed -0.120*** (0.046) -0.282** (0.121) -0.106*** (0.037) 
Protestant 0.017 (0.073) -0.022 (0.063) 0.061* (0.037) 
Catholic -0.022 (0.033) -0.149*** (0.043) -0.047** (0.022) 
Eastern Orthodox -0.006 (0.054) 0.008 (0.096) -0.092* (0.048) 
Muslim 0.000 (0.058) -0.041 (0.110) -0.056 (0.048) 
Jew 0.329 (0.223) -0.297 (0.237) 0.042 (0.186) 
Other Christian -0.095 (0.076) 0.032 (0.084) -0.023 (0.049) 
Skilled worker 0.156 (0.125) -0.091 (0.223) 0.105 (0.094) 
Unskilled worker 0.137 (0.146) -0.117 (0.236) 0.090 (0.108) 
Manufacturing/construction -0.131 (0.131) 0.008 (0.229) -0.108 (0.097) 
Agriculture -0.256*** (0.059) -0.452* (0.261) -0.189*** (0.071) 
Trade/services -0.046 (0.044) -0.080 (0.072) -0.064** (0.030) 
Carer -0.034 (0.062) 0.000 (0.111) -0.020 (0.033) 
Area characteristics       
Living in urban area 0.040 (0.028) 0.063 (0.045) 0.032* (0.017) 
Mean area income -0.035 (0.022) -0.155 (0.094) -0.016 (0.017) 
Immigrant characteristics       
Years since migration: < 2 0.548* (0.398) 0.008 (0.392) 0.175 (0.196) 
Years since migration: 2-5 0.603*** (0.116) 0.615** (0.295) 0.246 (0.161) 
Years since migration: 6-10 0.525*** (0.117) 0.524** (0.257) 0.242* (0.132) 
Years since migration: 11-20 0.384*** (0.119) 0.504*** (0.184) 0.183* (0.100) 
Immigration year -0.042*** (0.007) -0.038** (0.016) -0.023** (0.009) 
Age at migration: <15 -0.418*** (0.128) 0.010 (0.376) -0.272 (0.171) 
Age at migration: 15-25 -0.256 (0.291) -0.096 (0.266) -0.204 (0.130) 
Age at migration: 26-35 -0.227 (0.201) -0.070 (0.215) -0.182 (0.111) 
Age at migration: 36-45 -0.081 (0.090) 0.070 (0.173) -0.128 (0.088) 
Language ability 0.067 (0.049) 0.205*** (0.071) 0.012 (0.030) 
Citizen 0.106*** (0.031) 0.112** (0.054) 0.064*** (0.021) 
Home country participation 0.002 (0.104) 0.158 (0.154) 0.102 (0.074) 
Host country participation 0.963*** (0.173) 3.546*** (1.138) 0.826*** (0.117) 
Constant   72.087** (0.385)   
Pseudo R-sq 0.180    0.139  
Wald, Pearson 
  /Prob > chi2 
chi2(37)= 
285.93 0.000 
chi2(2886)= 
3883.003 0.000 
chi2(37) 
=4231.14 0.000 
Observations 1302  2939  2933  
Marginal effects of probit estimations are reported in column 1 and 3. Coefficients in column 2. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country of birth, column 1-2. Bootstrapped standard errors in 
column 3, number of replications: 1000. Significance at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 5-1. Home Country Effects 
Panel A. First Stage Regression 
 Coefficients St.Errors  Coefficients St.Errors 
AL -1.146 (0.787) HU -0.772 (0.790) 
AM -0.270 (0.873) IE -0.818 (0.795) 
AR -0.979 (0.844) IN -1.375* (0.798) 
AT -0.992 (0.783) IS -1.227 (0.931) 
AU -1.061 (0.888) IT -0.935 (0.764) 
BA -1.036 (0.771) JP -1.287 (0.909) 
BD -1.452 (0.913) LV -0.808 (0.938) 
BE -0.827 (0.771) MA -0.914 (0.772) 
BG -1.288 (0.849) NL -0.868 (0.774) 
BR -0.776 (0.811) NO -1.212 (0.816) 
CA -0.942 (0.842) NZ -0.380 (1.033) 
CH -0.319 (0.854) PE -0.882 (0.846) 
CL -0.800 (0.810) PH -1.245 (0.801) 
CN -1.902** (0.851) PL -1.249 (0.767) 
CO -1.308 (0.835) PT -0.685 (0.765) 
CS -0.661 (0.788) RO -1.135 (0.776) 
CZ -0.800 (0.799) RU -1.424* (0.771) 
DE -0.800 (0.759) SE -1.024 (0.796) 
DK -0.863 (0.792) SI -0.368 (0.909) 
EE -1.366 (0.847) SK -1.035 (0.800) 
ES -0.647 (0.778) TR -1.008 (0.764) 
FI -0.467 (0.787) UA -1.380* (0.826) 
FR -0.727 (0.764) UG -1.199 (0.887) 
GB -0.749 (0.764) US -1.151 (0.791) 
GE -0.771 (0.814) VN -1.579** (0.796) 
GR -0.902 (0.817) ZA -0.818 (0.831) 
HR -1.213 (0.779) Const: -1.273* (0.750) 
      
Observations 2956  Pseudo R2 0.122  
Omitted group: Latvia. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Panel B. Second Stage Regression 
 
 (1) (2) 
Home participation rate 0.705*** (0.217) -0.503 (0.429) 
Empowerment rights index   0.044 (0.030) 
GDP per capita   0.000 (0.000) 
School enrolment rates   -0.001 (0.002) 
1 if industrialized   0.374* (0.224) 
Religious fragmentation   -0.397* (0.208) 
Migration rate   0.033* (0.018) 
Constant -0.926*** (0.134) -1.075*** (0.301) 
Observations 54  54  
R-squared 0.14  0.70  
Bootstrapped standard errors, number of replications 1000 
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Table 5-2. Destination Country Effects 
Panel A. First Stage Regression 
 Coefficients St.Errors  Coefficients St.Errors 
AT 0.804** (0.395) GR -0.319 (0.397) 
BE 0.915** (0.396) HU -0.195 (0.455) 
CH 0.711* (0.390) IE 0.795** (0.399) 
DE 0.439 (0.390) LU 0.869** (0.389) 
CZ 0.275 (0.410) NL 0.572 (0.398) 
DK 1.219*** (0.420) NO 1.320*** (0.406) 
ES 0.467 (0.412) PT -0.043 (0.476) 
FI 1.162*** (0.430) SE 1.521*** (0.394) 
FR 1.010** (0.403) SI 0.339 (0.417) 
GB 0.559 (0.400) Constant -2.643*** (0.472) 
      
Observations 2956  Pseudo R2 0.13  
Omitted group: Poland (has the smallest number of immigrants). 
 
Panel B. Second Stage Regression 
 
 (1) (2) 
Host participation rate 2.267*** (0.183) 2.258*** (0.415) 
Empowerment rights index   0.008 (0.044) 
GDP per capita   -0.000 (0.000) 
Religious fragmentation   -0.086 (0.390) 
Migration rate   0.003 (0.028) 
Constant -0.613*** (0.120) -0.630 (0.503) 
Observations 19  19  
R-squared 0.86  0.87  
Bootstrapped standard errors, number of replications 1000 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variables’ Definition and Data Sources  
 
TU member: equals 1 if an individual is an active member of a trade union, 0 otherwise.  
PARTY member: equals 1 if an individual is an active member of a political party, 0 otherwise.  
Work for Party, Work for an Association, Signing Petitions, Demonstrations, Boycotting Products: equals 1 if 
an individual undertook one of these activities in the past 12 month   
Civic Participation: equals one if a least one of the previous variables equals one. 
Age: age of individuals, from 15 to 70  
Age squared 
Gender: dummy equal to 1 if male, 2 if female 
Education: years of completed schooling 
Income: levels of income on a scale from 1 to 12 
Married: dummy equal to 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
Divorced: dummy equal to 1 if divorced or separated, 0 otherwise 
Employee: dummy equal to 1 if employed, 0 if self-employed, working in family business 
Unemployed: dummy equal to 1 if actively or inactively unemployed in the last 7 days 
Skilled worker: dummy equal to 1 if an individual reports working in occupations coded 6000-8000, ISO standard 
Unskilled worker: dummy equal to 1 if an individual reports working in occupations coded 9000-es, ISO standard 
Protestant: dummy equal to 1 if Protestant, 0 otherwise 
Catholic: dummy equal to 1 if Catholic, 0 otherwise 
Jewish: dummy equal to 1 if Jewish, 0 otherwise 
Muslim: dummy equal to 1 if Muslim, 0 otherwise 
Other Christian: dummy equal to 1 if belongs to other religion (excluded: other religions) 
Years since migration: >2: for immigrants, length of stay in a country: less than two years 
Years since migration: 2-5: 2 to 5 years 
Years since migration: 6-10: 6 to 10 years 
Years since migration: 11-20: 11 to 20 years (omitted category: over 20 years) 
Immigr_year: arrival year, cohort effects 
Language proficiency: dummy equal to 1 if an individual speaks any official language of a country of residence at 
home (two mentioned languages are reported)  
Citizen: dummy equal to 1 if an immigrant has a citizenship of the country of residence 
Parent_born_cntr: dummy equal to one if one of the parents is born in the country of residence 
Age at migration: a set of dummies indicating the age of an individual at the time of migration 
 
Urban: dummy equal to 1 if an individual lives in a big city or on the outskirts of a big city 
Mean income area: average level of income by area of residence  
 
Host Participation Rate: average level of civic participation, by host country, calculated separately for immigrants 
and natives. Source: ESS. 
Home Participation Rate: average level of civic participation in the source country; for immigrants. Source: WVS. 
 
GDP: GDP per capita values, 2003. World Bank Development Indicators. 2006 
Enrolment: Secondary school enrollment, (% gross). World Bank Development Indicators. 2006. 
Migration rate: net migration rates per 1000 of population, average 2000-2005. Source: Population Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 
2005 Revision.  
Religious Fragmentation: index constructed using the following formula:  
Religioni = 1 - 
2
kik
s∑ , 
where s is a share of k major religion denominations in country i (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) 
Source of the information on percentages of religious denominations: CIA World Factbook. 2006.  
Empowerment Rights Index: an aggregate index of freedom of movement, freedom of speech, degree of 
protection of workers’ rights, political participation, and freedom of religion indicators. Range: 0 (no government 
respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights). Source: Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights Database. www.ciri. binghamton.edu. Details of construction are in David, Gelleny, and 
Sacko, 2001. 
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Variable 
Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives
Dependent Variable      
CIVIC_PARTIC 0.489 0.547 0.500 0.498 3878 62234 
       
Individual characteristics 
Number of hh members 2.969 2.935 1.482 1.429 3876 62215 
Age  42.44 42.722 13.96 15.279 3837 62234 
Age squared 1996.2 2058.609 1226.922 1319.837 3837 62234 
Gender (1-m, 2-f) 1.537 1.521 0.498 0.499 3878 62202 
Years of schooling 12.178 12.122 4.271 3.756 3813 61622 
Income 6.849 6.335 2.457 2.523 2996 48910 
Married 0.595 0.528 0.4908 0.499 3878 62234 
Divorced 0.113 0.086 0.317 0.281 3878 62234 
Employee 0.775 0.742 0.418 0.437 3878 62234 
Unemployed 0.074 0.061 0.261 0.241 3878 62234 
Protestant  0.074 0.144 0.262 0.351 3878 62234 
Catholic 0.3061 0.329 0.461 0.470 3878 62234 
Jewish 0.004 0.001 0.060 0.022 3878 62234 
Muslim 0.087 0.004 0.282 0.064 3878 62234 
Eastern Orthodox 0.073 0. 055 0.261 0.227 3878 62233 
Other religion 0.405 0.449 0.491 0.497 3878 62233 
Skilled worker 0.209 0.216 0.406 0.411 3878 62233 
Unskilled worker 0.254 0.216 0.435 0.412 3878 62233 
Manufacturing/construction 0.460 0.409 0.498 0.491 3878 62233 
Agriculture  0.021 0.041 0.143 0.199 3878 62233 
Trade/services 0.127 0.134 0.333 0.340 3878 62233 
Carer 0.072 0.027 0 .258 0.161 3878 62233 
Total hours worked 39.451 40.054 15.137 14.867 3288 52257 
Additional Immigrants’ 
Characteristics 
Length of stay 3.954 - 1.136 - 3854 - 
Cohort: arrival time 1982.27 - 14.27 - 3850 - 
Age at migration 15.34 - 15.53 - 3878  
Parent born in host country 0.108 - 0.310 - 3878 - 
Citizen 0.418 - 0.493 - 3871 - 
Language proficiency 0.845 - 0.362 - 3878 - 
Area Characteristics 
Urban 0.450 0.308 0.492 0.462 3878 62234 
Mean income area 7.149 6.424 1.297 1.394 3878 62234 
Institutional and Cultural  
Proxies 
Home country civic 
participation 0.499 0.547 0.205 0.498 3878 62234 
GDP per capita 6516.89 27638.83 8543.63 13169.23 3850 62233 
Secondary school 
enrolment 101.185 - 25.31 - 3878 - 
Net migration rate 1.159 2.943 3.148 2.816 3878 62233 
Religious fragmentation 0.352 0.367 0.232 0.221 3819 62233 
Empowerment right index 7.830 8.779 2.547 1.633 3761 62233 
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Table A3. Percentage of Various Types of Activities, Immigrants and Natives 
 
  TU 
member 
Party 
member 
Work 
for 
party 
Work for 
other 
orgntn 
Signing 
Petitions 
Public 
Demonstrat
ion 
Boycott 
Products 
im 
% of individuals 
involved in this 
activity 
nat 
19.07 
23.73 
3.40 
4.98 
3.72 
4.89 
10.66 
15.19 
21.45 
24.72 
9.17 
8.14 
16.55 
16.61 
im 
out of those 
involved in this 
activity, % for 
whom this is the 
only type of civic 
involvement 
nat 
51.34 
43.62 
17.45 
17.49 
8.05 
7.82 
19.48 
19.47 
30.17 
27.12 
17.02 
17.13 
29.18 
22.13 
 
 
Table A4. Overlap of Various Types of Activities, Immigrants 
 
 TU 
member, 
% 
Party 
member,
% 
Work for 
party,  
% 
Work for 
other 
orgntn, % 
Signing 
Petitions, 
% 
Public 
Demonstra 
tion, % 
Boycotting 
Products, 
% 
TU member _ 
 6.63 7.05 17.47 28.91 14.99 22.58 
Party member 37.58 _  42.57 36.49 43.62 30.20 27.03 
Work for party 36.21 39.13 _  56.65 60.69 47.13 41.86 
Work for other 
orgntn 31.33 11.14 19.68 
_ 52.73 27.97 37.65 
Signing Petitions 25.67 7.12 10.50 26.10 _ 26.00 40.32 
Public 
Demonstration 31.24 11.08 19.16 32.48 60.89 
_ 40.61 
Boycotting 
Products 26.07 5.79 9.35 24.16 52.21 22.47 
_ 
Comment: The table reads horizontally. For example, of all party members, 37.58% are also trade 
union members, and 27.03% are boycotting certain products. However, of all those who are 
boycotting products, only 5.79% are party members.  
 
 
Table A5. Number of Civic Involvements, Immigrants 
    
Number of involvements per person Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 2,011 51.86 51.86 
1 1,013 26.12 77.98 
2 441 11.37 89.35 
3 247 6.37 95.72 
4 114 2.94 98.66 
5 31 0.80 99.46 
6 16 0.41 99.87 
7 5 0.13 100.00 
Total 3,878 100.00  
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Table A6. Destination Country Summary Statistics 
 
Country 
Obs 
Total Obs by Group 
TU Memb.  
Rates 
Party Memb. 
Rates 
Work for Party 
 Rates 
Work for Org 
Rates 
Signing Petition 
Rates 
Demonstration 
Rates 
Boycotting 
Rates 
Civic Particip. 
Rates 
  Nat Imm Nat Imm Nat Imm Nat Imm Nat Imm Nat Imm Nat Imm Nat Imm Nat Imm 
Austria 4511 3709 268 0.217 0.133 0.116 0.035 0.103 0.034 0.204 0.129 0.275 0.244 0.091 0.118 0.221 0.231 0.608 0.506 
Belgium 3671 2929 203 0.341 0.239 0.065 0.050 0.047 0.069 0.208 0.148 0.302 0.276 0.077 0.108 0.116 0.173 0.653 0.559 
Switzerland 4169 2972 565 0.150 0.092 0.080 0.021 0.084 0.035 0.177 0.090 0.440 0.304 0.087 0.094 0.326 0.250 0.656 0.511 
Czech Rep. 4386 3504 98 0.094 0.109 0.033 0.042 0.035 0.061 0.098 0.115 0.144 0.156 0.038 0.082 0.086 0.096 0.340 0.336 
Germany 5785 4685 321 0.140 0.090 0.032 0.008 0.040 0.009 0.213 0.081 0.349 0.171 0.117 0.072 0.249 0.134 0.607 0.351 
Denmark 2990 2512 76 0.710 0.491 0.062 0.018 0.045 0.067 0.217 0.160 0.305 0.203 0.072 0.080 0.271 0.267 0.867 0.652 
Spain 3386 2684 112 0.086 0.034 0.037 0.007 0.074 0.036 0.180 0.144 0.271 0.125 0.286 0.188 0.125 0.107 0.502 0.345 
Finland 4022 3446 48 0.537 0.338 0.058 0.029 0.038 0.021 0.308 0.146 0.266 0.188 0.020 0.083 0.298 0.292 0.797 0.603 
France 3291 2611 124 0.074 0.084 0.017 0.037 0.044 0.089 0.175 0.202 0.357 0.331 0.160 0.138 0.299 0.333 0.563 0.550 
Great Britain 3931 2993 154 0.187 0.104 0.017 0.022 0.026 0.045 0.089 0.110 0.409 0.327 0.044 0.078 0.245 0.240 0.593 0.444 
Greece 4968 3619 287 0.112 0.072 0.063 0.029 0.065 0.007 0.065 0.018 0.047 0.014 0.056 0.007 0.080 0.021 0.282 0.126 
Hungary 3183 2757 39 0.103 0.065 0.011 0.022 0.019 0.026 0.024 0.000 0.051 0.051 0.028 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.205 0.152 
Ireland 4329 3573 153 0.213 0.186 0.049 0.025 0.047 0.054 0.135 0.155 0.256 0.324 0.063 0.107 0.121 0.250 0.495 0.553 
Luxembourg 3184 1964 778 0.317 0.228 0.111 0.011 0.054 0.018 0.258 0.110 0.282 0.191 0.214 0.111 0.162 0.131 0.679 0.484 
Netherlands 4235 3429 147 0.230 0.171 0.050 0.029 0.036 0.048 0.213 0.116 0.241 0.286 0.036 0.082 0.105 0.153 0.533 0.463 
Norway 3796 3162 133 0.506 0.385 0.082 0.036 0.092 0.158 0.268 0.286 0.400 0.398 0.097 0.203 0.230 0.316 0.797 0.733 
Poland 3826 3436 15 0.084 0.105 0.014 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.088 0.067 0.016 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.228 0.211 
Portugal 3554 2786 43 0.096 0.081 0.035 0.010 0.029 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.041 0.023 0.027 0.047 0.207 0.152 
Sweden 3937 3093 244 0.638 0.591 0.069 0.053 0.043 0.025 0.263 0.160 0.482 0.434 0.066 0.094 0.365 0.311 0.879 0.807 
Slovenia 2960 2370 70 0.231 0.326 0.038 0.021 0.035 0.029 0.017 0.029 0.098 0.074 0.023 0.029 0.038 0.059 0.358 0.368 
                    
Total 78114 62234 3878 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Average 3906 3112 194 0.253 0.196 0.052 0.025 0.049 0.042 0.161 0.110 0.256 0.208 0.082 0.085 0.173 0.173 0.542 0.445 
Std.Dev 697.76 595.42 187.93 0.196 0.155 0.030 0.014 0.023 0.036 0.089 0.074 0.134 0.127 0.069 0.055 0.107 0.107 0.215 0.191 
Max 5785 4685 778 0.710 0.591 0.116 0.053 0.103 0.158 0.308 0.286 0.482 0.434 0.286 0.203 0.365 0.333 0.879 0.807 
Min 2960 1964 15 0.074 0.034 0.011 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.205 0.126 
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Table A7. Source Country Summary Statistics (ESS rounds pooled and WVS) 
Country Obs 
TU Memb.  
Rates 
Party Memb. 
Rates 
Work for Party 
 Rates 
Work for Org 
Rates 
Signing Petition 
Rates 
Demonstration 
Rates 
Boycotting 
Rates 
Civic Particip. 
Rates 
 ESS WVS Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home 
AL 166 1000 0.082 0.094 0.028 0.145 0.011 0.114 0.028 0.405 0.036 0.152 0.017 0.193 0.037 0.037 0.161 0.404 
AM 12 2000 0.089 0.013 0.029 0.012 0.018 N/a 0.042 N/a 0.067 0.173 0.026 0.275 0.058 0.116 0.204 0.372 
AR 19 1280 0.054 0.025 0.014 0.045 0.041 0.030 0.136 0.159 0.194 0.215 0.158 0.128 0.169 0.018 0.410 0.295 
AT 57 1522 0.144 0.189 0.021 0.118 0.034 0.034 0.099 0.201 0.275 0.552 0.094 0.157 0.219 0.093 0.498 0.653 
AU 13 2048 0.117 0.119 0.024 0.026 0.037 N/a 0.101 N/a 0.262 0.786 0.075 0.180 0.198 0.213 0.412 0.813 
BA 140 1200 0.302 0.068 0.029 0.071 0.041 0.031 0.112 0.101 0.238 0.207 0.088 0.086 0.194 0.063 0.535 0.323 
BD 9 1499 0.168 0.148 0.025 0.235 0.044 0.229 0.130 0.577 0.316 0.130 0.098 0.063 0.236 0.053 0.498 0.382 
BE 124 1912 0.209 0.158 0.015 0.070 0.027 0.029 0.115 0.253 0.211 0.709 0.109 0.389 0.150 0.115 0.483 0.775 
BG 26 1000 0.103 0.071 0.026 0.047 0.016 0.037 0.046 0.097 0.090 0.102 0.036 0.148 0.088 0.033 0.248 0.265 
BR 51 1149 0.115 0.097 0.018 0.072 0.020 N/a 0.058 N/a 0.130 0.466 0.062 0.247 0.126 0.062 0.318 0.584 
CA 20 1931 0.168 0.134 0.024 0.061 0.047 0.027 0.125 0.372 0.276 0.734 0.094 0.192 0.223 0.185 0.494 0.770 
CH 22 1212 0.174 0.059 0.021 0.067 0.033 N/a 0.121 N/a 0.224 0.662 0.103 0.164 0.188 0.106 0.472 0.693 
CL 25 1200 0.345 0.031 0.036 0.025 0.075 0.019 0.189 0.301 0.359 0.183 0.141 0.149 0.281 0.047 0.666 0.275 
CN 23 1000 0.166 0.069 0.022 0.083 0.036 0.099 0.119 0.495 0.242 N/a 0.105 N/a 0.186 N/a 0.470 0.191 
CO 22 6025 0.113 0.038 0.015 0.060 0.034 N/a 0.134 N/a 0.189 0.181 0.154 0.110 0.151 0.072 0.426 0.280 
CS 59 1908 0.163 0.136 0.025 0.058 0.029 0.013 0.103 0.035 0.246 0.273 0.088 0.226 0.210 0.178 0.477 0.421 
CZ 33 2036 0.138 0.102 0.022 0.041 0.027 0.024 0.102 0.183 0.214 0.561 0.087 0.260 0.173 0.082 0.426 0.647 
DE 351 1023 0.173 0.070 0.025 0.029 0.036 0.011 0.113 0.114 0.264 0.519 0.099 0.320 0.211 0.076 0.508 0.587 
DK 47 1005 0.369 0.543 0.033 0.066 0.083 0.026 0.197 0.212 0.335 0.552 0.143 0.284 0.264 0.239 0.661 0.815 
EE 17 2409 0.354 0.047 0.032 0.017 0.023 0.015 0.145 0.134 0.225 0.189 0.084 0.101 0.291 0.028 0.618 0.293 
ES 66 1038 0.140 0.037 0.024 0.017 0.045 0.012 0.122 0.107 0.268 0.240 0.098 0.241 0.223 0.049 0.484 0.359 
FI 92 1615 0.539 0.336 0.049 0.061 0.031 0.026 0.158 0.217 0.416 0.480 0.097 0.139 0.304 0.143 0.772 0.652 
FR 242 1000 0.197 0.041 0.021 0.019 0.034 0.007 0.117 0.162 0.235 0.671 0.108 0.383 0.171 0.119 0.501 0.716 
GB 197 2008 0.199 0.073 0.026 0.026 0.054 0.013 0.148 0.247 0.297 0.791 0.111 0.128 0.228 0.159 0.536 0.807 
GE 38 1142 0.120 0.007 0.026 0.020 0.014 N/a 0.043 N/a 0.062 0.135 0.029 0.189 0.058 0.056 0.221 0.270 
GR 22 1003 0.200 0.083 0.025 0.079 0.036 0.052 0.120 0.323 0.271 0.484 0.093 0.461 0.201 0.043 0.501 0.670 
HR 81 1000 0.204 0.118 0.025 0.050 0.037 0.020 0.091 0.145 0.218 0.364 0.082 0.074 0.184 0.075 0.475 0.474 
HU 41 1012 0.217 0.071 0.035 0.017 0.042 0.009 0.128 0.115 0.266 0.152 0.101 0.047 0.213 0.027 0.526 0.227 
IE 40 2002 0.124 0.101 0.023 0.043 0.042 0.020 0.110 0.206 0.315 0.594 0.082 0.212 0.232 0.081 0.458 0.652 
IN 46 968 0.151 0.081 0.027 0.114 0.044 0.082 0.114 0.276 0.286 0.238 0.084 0.188 0.212 0.105 0.459 0.375 
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Table A7. Source Country Summary Statistics (continued) 
Country Obs 
TU Memb.  
Rates 
Party Memb. 
Rates 
Work for Party 
 Rates 
Work for Org 
Rates 
Signing Petition 
Rates 
Demonstration 
Rates 
Boycotting 
Rates 
Civic Particip. 
Rates 
 ESS WVS Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home Imm Home 
IS 8 2000 0.453 0.597 0.036 0.190 0.071 0.034 0.185 0.158 0.354 0.525 0.116 0.205 0.292 0.176 0.704 0.865 
IT 252 1362 0.162 0.062 0.024 0.041 0.037 0.023 0.113 0.168 0.251 0.524 0.103 0.330 0.193 0.097 0.498 0.624 
JP 7 1018 0.188 0.065 0.026 0.035 0.033 0.012 0.125 0.094 0.267 0.568 0.114 0.096 0.215 0.066 0.515 0.606 
LT 5 1013 0.245 0.022 0.027 0.020 0.035 0.019 0.109 0.103 0.279 0.253 0.073 0.118 0.173 0.040 0.499 0.330 
LV 6 2264 0.323 0.113 0.022 0.019 0.038 0.009 0.133 0.144 0.251 0.177 0.084 0.237 0.227 0.037 0.561 0.410 
MA 101 1535 0.131 0.005 0.029 0.007 0.059 N/a 0.153 N/a 0.251 0.134 0.131 0.105 0.200 0.061 0.481 0.211 
NL 95 1003 0.213 0.236 0.028 0.093 0.041 0.026 0.123 0.331 0.249 0.613 0.105 0.323 0.179 0.218 0.517 0.751 
NO 23 1127 0.465 0.155 0.037 0.032 0.030 N/a 0.141 N/a 0.326 0.645 0.089 0.261 0.265 0.179 0.682 0.721 
NZ 5 1201 0.201 0.055 0.029 0.018 0.041 N/a 0.120 N/a 0.348 0.881 0.081 0.186 0.255 0.162 0.517 0.886 
PE 15 1501 0.213 0.045 0.023 0.047 0.042 0.033 0.134 0.343 0.244 0.210 0.123 0.161 0.195 0.072 0.511 0.358 
PH 32 1200 0.215 0.039 0.024 0.043 0.053 0.038 0.138 0.458 0.272 0.104 0.108 0.068 0.214 0.051 0.526 0.208 
PL 148 1095 0.186 0.100 0.023 0.009 0.030 0.006 0.112 0.092 0.232 0.209 0.089 0.088 0.181 0.043 0.462 0.306 
PT 359 1000 0.202 0.024 0.015 0.016 0.026 0.010 0.116 0.101 0.216 0.260 0.111 0.164 0.162 0.055 0.493 0.326 
RO 95 1146 0.119 0.092 0.024 0.023 0.032 0.018 0.087 0.079 0.167 0.090 0.079 0.134 0.142 0.015 0.365 0.234 
RU 118 2500 0.152 0.231 0.016 0.007 0.024 0.003 0.099 0.028 0.183 0.109 0.081 0.230 0.157 0.023 0.403 0.435 
SE 36 1015 0.315 0.624 0.030 0.103 0.087 0.043 0.191 0.425 0.299 0.871 0.132 0.353 0.274 0.334 0.623 0.945 
SI 14 1006 0.112 0.169 0.026 0.030 0.034 0.013 0.105 0.201 0.272 0.307 0.100 0.092 0.228 0.077 0.494 0.464 
SK 91 1331 0.108 0.162 0.038 0.069 0.055 0.051 0.109 0.318 0.165 0.574 0.083 0.132 0.110 0.035 0.349 0.644 
TR 220 4607 0.178 0.005 0.026 0.009 0.033 0.008 0.110 0.008 0.232 0.150 0.085 0.074 0.181 0.062 0.460 0.186 
UA 32 1195 0.098 0.210 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.054 0.072 0.105 0.125 0.052 0.167 0.090 0.044 0.274 0.385 
UG 11 1002 0.174 0.077 0.027 0.095 0.035 0.061 0.094 0.604 0.240 0.161 0.060 0.121 0.189 0.103 0.409 0.344 
US 45 1200 0.181 0.127 0.026 0.187 0.055 0.066 0.132 0.578 0.258 0.809 0.101 0.204 0.211 0.244 0.485 0.852 
VN 38 995 0.237 0.114 0.031 0.286 0.063 0.239 0.154 0.547 0.312 0.052 0.116 0.018 0.257 0.005 0.579 0.361 
ZA 21 3000 0.188 0.063 0.022 0.092 0.046 0.043 0.120 0.431 0.269 0.249 0.087 0.128 0.217 0.129 0.485 0.407 
                   
Total 3878 83463                 
Average 72 1546 0.198 0.121 0.026 0.061 0.039 0.039 0.117 0.238 0.242 0.379 0.094 0.184 0.194 0.094 0.478 0.499 
Std.Dev 83.54 899.32 0.099 0.132 0.006 0.058 0.016 0.049 0.035 0.161 0.075 0.245 0.029 0.095 0.059 0.069 0.118 0.205 
Max 359 6025 0.539 0.624 0.049 0.286 0.087 0.239 0.197 0.604 0.416 0.881 0.158 0.461 0.304 0.334 0.772 0.945 
Min 5 968 0.054 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.028 0.008 0.036 0.052 0.017 0.018 0.037 0.005 0.161 0.186 
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Table A8. Example of the Propensity Score Estimation. Albanians 
 
 
Treatment (immigration) Frequency Percent 
0 (natives in Albania, WVS) 1000 14.327 
1 (Albanian emigrants, ESS) 166 85.763 
 
 
Probit estimates                        
 
Dep. Variable: Immigrant Coeff Std. 
Error 
P>|z| 
Younger than 25 0.631 0.153 0.000 
Older than 45 0.802 0.129 0.000 
Secondary education 1.529 0.188 0.000 
Female -0.366 0.101 0.000 
Constant -2.369 0.250 0.000 
N. obs 1166   
LR chi2(4) 157.98   
Pseudo R2 0.166   
 
Description of the estimated propensity score  
 
Percentiles      Smallest Largest       
1%  0.0009641  .0009641 
5%  0.0031182  .0009641 
10%  0.0067583  .0009641       Obs                1166 
25%  0.026621  .0009641       Sum of Wgt.        1166 
 
50%  0.1140345                   Mean           .1423853 
                             Std. Dev.      .1219163 
75%  0.2208893  .3433954 
90%  0.3433954  .3433954       Variance       .0148636 
95%  0.3433954  .3433954       Skewness       .4084666 
99%  0.3433954  .3433954       Kurtosis       1.726445 
The final number of blocks is 4 
 
 
Calculated average participation rate, by blocks: 
 
Block number Participation rates 
 Mean Frequency Percent 
1 0.2965 56 33.73 
2 0.4333 34 20.48 
3 0.4752 12 7.23 
4 0.5776 64 38.55 
 
Each Albanian emigrant is assigned one of these four participation rates, which serve her as a reference participating 
average. The assignment is based on the propensity score. For example, if emigrant’s characteristics produce a propensity 
score that falls within the first interval, the relevant reference participation rate is the average participation of those non-
emigrants, whose characteristics produce propensity scores which fall within the same interval. To compare, average civic 
participation rate of all non-emigrant Albanians is 0.444. This value was used uniformly for all Albanian emigrants in 
estimations described in Tables 1-6. Also note that the number of blocks and, hence, of reference groups, differs by country 
of origin. The maximum number is 5, for Bosnians.  
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Figure A1. Civic Participation: Natives and Immigrants 
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Figure A2. Country Dummies and Country Effects 
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